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CASENOTES
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC. V CLINE:
SHRINKING THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY
FOR REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION SUITS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA"),1 the purpose of which is "to promote em-
ployment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."2 The statute's primary
prohibitive measure is United States Code section 623(a)(1),
which makes it illegal for employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."3 The
class of persons that the statute protects is limited to those peo-
ple forty years of age and older.4
While it seems elementary that the ADEA protects older work-
ers from being discriminated against in favor of younger workers,
it was not always as clear whether the ADEA does the opposite:
protect younger workers from age discrimination, otherwise
known as reverse age discrimination.' In 2004, the Supreme
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
2. Id. § 621(b).
3. Id. § 623(a)(1).
4. Id. § 631(a).
5. For an illustration of contrasting views on reverse age discrimination claims,
compare Cline v. General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004), with Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Court of the United States resolved the confusion in General Dy-
namics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.6
This note examines General Dynamics and its impact on the
future of age discrimination law. Specifically, Part II explains the
reverse age discrimination case history that preceded the Court's
decision in General Dynamics. Part III examines the Court's opin-
ion in detail and attempts to resolve some of the dissent's most
important criticisms. Finally, Part IV discusses the impact the
case will have on age discrimination law in general.
II. THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Reverse Age Discrimination
Before General Dynamics, the Supreme Court of the United
States had never directly considered a reverse age discrimination
case. The Court's decisions, however, have consistently indicated
that the ADEA only covers discrimination against the old, in fa-
vor of the young. In 1985, the Court issued its opinion in Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell.7 In holding that age qualifications im-
plemented by employers pursuant to exceptions in the ADEA
must be "'reasonably necessary' to their businesses,' the Court
noted that "[tihroughout the legislative history of the ADEA, one
empirical fact is repeatedly emphasized: the process of psycho-
logical and physiological degeneration caused by aging varies
with each individual.... As a result, many older American work-
ers perform at levels equal or superior to their younger col-
leagues."9 The references to "degeneration" and the level at which
older workers can perform indicate that the Court believed the
ADEA to apply only to individuals increasing in years.
In the 1993 case of Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,"° the Court con-
sidered whether an employer violated the ADEA when it inter-
fered with the vesting of an employee's pension benefits." It held
6. 124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
7. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
8. Id. at 419.
9. Id. at 409.
10. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
11. Id. at 608.
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that the employer did not violate the ADEA because his actions
were not motivated by the employee's age.12 In its decision, the
Court noted that "[ilt is the very essence of age discrimination for
an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that
productivity and competence decline with old age."1
Three years later, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 4 the Court considered whether an older worker could
claim age discrimination when replaced by a younger employee
who was also a member of the ADEA's protected class.15 Here,
O'Connor was fired at age fifty-six and replaced by a person forty
years of age who also fell within the class protected by the
ADEA. 16 The Court concluded that, for ADEA purposes, it did not
matter whether a person was discriminated against in favor of a
younger person within the protected class, so long as the dis-
crimination was on the basis of age. 7 The Court said that an in-
ference of discrimination could be drawn from "the fact that a re-
placement is substantially younger than the plaintiff."" The
Court's language here, particularly the phrase "substantially
younger," represented unwillingness on the part of the Court to
recognize an action for age discrimination in favor of older work-
ers. Decisions such as these show that the Court has traditionally
considered the ADEA to pertain exclusively to those discrimi-
nated against in favor of younger people.
12. Id. at 612. A company's decision to fire an older worker whose pension is close to
vesting as a result of his years of service "would not be the result of an inaccurate and
denigrating generalization about age, but would rather represent an accurate judgment
about the employee-that he indeed is 'close to vesting." Id.
13. Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
14. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
15. Id. at 309.
16. Id. at 309-10.
17. Id. at 312. The lower federal courts used a test adapted from McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to determine whether there was a prima facie case of
age discrimination. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-12. Before O'Connor, the fourth factor of
that test had been that a plaintiff had to show that "following his discharge or demotion,
he was replaced by someone of comparable qualifications outside the protected class." Id.
at 310. The Court in O'Connor, however, modified the fourth factor, stating that "the fact
that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a
proper element of the McDonnell Douglas" test. Id. at 312.
18. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313.
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B. The Courts of Appeals' Treatment of Reverse Age
Discrimination
The different circuits have addressed the question of reverse
discrimination more directly. The prevailing legal view among
the courts of appeals has generally been that the ADEA does not
allow for reverse discrimination lawsuits.19 Before any courts had
the opportunity to address reverse age discrimination directly,
many noted their disapproval of the concept in dicta. In a 1988
decision, Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.,2 ° the plaintiff sued his em-
ployer for age discrimination when his job was eliminated and he
was forced to accept a severance plan.21 The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in its discussion of the case
that the ADEA "does not forbid treating older persons more gen-
erously than others."22
In the same year that Schuler was decided, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit handed down its deci-
sion in Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago.23 In that case, the
plaintiff challenged certain aspects of an early retirement pro-
gram that resulted in fewer benefits the older a person was when
he retired.24 In dicta, the court explicitly stated that "the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act does not protect the young as
well as the old, or even, we think, the younger against the
older."25
19. Tracey A. Cullen, Note, Reverse Age Discrimination Suits and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 18 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 271, 277 (2003) (noting that
the majority of federal courts do not allow reverse age discrimination claims); see also
Tamar Buchakjian, Comment, Old vs. Older: Creating a Cause of Action for Reverse Age
Discrimination Under the ADEA in Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1627, 1639 (2003) (explaining that the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits do not allow reverse age discrimination suits).
20. 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988).
21. Id. at 278.
22. Id. The court of appeals ended up holding in favor of the employer, since Schuler
could not show a prima facie case of age discrimination. Id.
23. 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1988).
24. Id. at 316. The early retirement program in question entitled younger retirees to
take a larger percentage of their accumulated sick pay than older retirees. Id. It also left
intact the health benefits of younger retirees, while those of older retirees were elimi-
nated. Id.
25. Id. at 318. The court said that if younger workers in the protected class could sue
for age discrimination in favor of older workers, "early retirement plans would effectively
be outlawed, and that was not the intent of the framers of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act." Id.
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In 1992, the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to address re-
verse age discrimination directly, for the first time, in Hamilton
v. Caterpillar Inc.26 Caterpillar implemented an early retirement
plan for its employees fifty years of age and older when it decided
to close two of its plants in Iowa." Michael Hamilton and others,
all between the ages of forty and fifty, brought a class action suit
against Caterpillar for age discrimination, since they were too
young to take advantage of the early retirement plan.2" The court
held that the ADEA does not allow for reverse discrimination
suits, noting that if Congress had meant to protect the young
from age discrimination it would not have limited the protected
class to those people who are forty years of age and older.29 Addi-
tionally, the court said that it could find no evidence of congres-
sional intent to protect the young from age discrimination. °
Finally, in Stone v. Travelers Corp.,31 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a severance
plan that afforded more choice in distribution of retirement bene-
fits to older employees violated the ADEA as discriminatory
against younger retirees.32 The court did not have to reach the
question of whether the ADEA provides a remedy for reverse age
discrimination, as it decided the case on narrower grounds,33 but
it expressed incredulity at the idea that the petitioner could re-
cover for being discriminated against because he was too young.34
Clearly, before 2004, few courts had directly considered the is-
sue of reverse age discrimination. Those that had occasion to dis-
cuss the issue uniformly concluded that the ADEA precludes such
lawsuits. This standard changed, however, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced its deci-
sion in General Dynamics.
26. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1227.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court drew a comparison between the limitation on the protected class in
the ADEA and the open class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id.
("[I] magine that only racial minorities and women could bring suit under Title VII. If Title
VII so limited the plaintiff class, we would be unlikely to read that statute to prohibit re-
verse discrimination either.").
30. Id. at 1228.
31. 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995).
32. Id. at 436.
33. Id. at 437 (finding that the minimum age exceptions in the ADEA precluded any
age discrimination claim).
34. See id. ("Stone claims that Travelers violated the ADEA by discriminating against
him because he was too young!").
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III. ANALYSIS OF GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND
SYSTEMS, INC. V. CLINE
A. Background
Before July 1997, General Dynamics Land Systems ("GDLS")
and its employees had a collective bargaining agreement that
gave full health benefits to those retired workers who had served
for thirty years or more.35 Beginning in July, a new collective bar-
gaining agreement modified this arrangement; the new agree-
ment only provided health benefits after retirement to those em-
ployees who were at least fifty years old as of the time the new
agreement went into effect.36 Cline and other employees objected
to the new agreement as a violation of the ADEA, as they were all
at least forty years old and protected by the age discrimination
laws, but they were not old enough to receive health benefits af-
ter retirement under the new agreement.37
Cline received a determination from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") that the new collective bar-
gaining agreement violated the ADEA, but informal settlement
attempts failed.3" Cline brought an action against GDLS in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
which dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Hamilton.39
Despite the apparent clarity and uniformity of the case law on
reverse age discrimination, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding
that the language of the ADEA was clear and that if Congress
had wanted to limit protection under the law to just the older, it
would have been more specific.4° Additionally, the court but-
tressed its conclusion with 29 C.F.R. section 1625.2(a),4 an inter-
pretive regulation issued by the EEOC which states that "if two
people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other
35. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys,, Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
124 S. Ct. 1236 (2004).
36. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1239 (2004).
37. Id. at 1239.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1239-40.
40. Id. at 1240.
41. Id.
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52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the
basis of age, but must make such decision on the basis of some
other factor."4 2 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to "resolve the conflict among the Circuits."4"
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter explained that, primar-
ily, the Court looked to the legislative history of the ADEA to con-
clude that the law does not provide for reverse age discrimination
lawsuits."* When Congress declined to include age in the Civil
Rights Act prohibitions against discrimination, it asked the Sec-
retary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, for a study on problems in age
discrimination.45 The Court noted that, in his report, Wirtz con-
centrated on discrimination against older workers and that the
report "was devoid of any indication that the Secretary had no-
ticed unfair advantages accruing to older employees at the ex-
pense of their juniors. "46
The report resulted in an official proposal for age discrimina-
tion legislation. The ensuing hearings, statements of finding, and
apparent purpose focused exclusively on discrimination against
older workers. 47 The Court concluded that "all the findings and
statements of objectives are either cast in terms of the effects of
age as intensifying over time, or are couched in terms that refer
to 'older' workers, explicitly or implicitly relative to 'younger'
ones."48 Therefore, the phrase from the ADEA that makes it ille-
gal for employers to "discriminate against any individual... be-
cause of such individual's age"49 refers only to discrimination
against older employees in favor of younger employees8 °
The Court also couched its conclusion in terms of social history,
noting that "[olne commonplace conception of American society in
recent decades is its character as a 'youth culture,' and in a world
where younger is better, talk about discrimination because of age
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2004).
43. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1240.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1241.
47. Id. at 1241-42.
48. Id. at 1242.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
50. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1243.
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is naturally understood to refer to discrimination against the
older." 1 According to the Court, Congress thought of age dis-
crimination in the same way in which any ordinary person
would.52
The Court found its holding to be further supported by the fact
that the protected class in the ADEA does not begin until age
forty. 3 If Congress had been concerned about discrimination
against the young when it passed the law, it would have included
younger people in the protected class.54 Finally, the Court found it
to be significant that its own case history, as well as that of the
lower federal courts, supported the notion that the ADEA does
not allow for reverse age discrimination lawsuits.5
C. The Majority and the Dissents: Contrasting the Arguments
1. Plain Meaning of Age
The majority concluded its opinion by addressing three specific
arguments made by Cline and the EEOC, who first argued that
the word "age" in the ADEA has a plain meaning that must apply
uniformly throughout the statute.56 A separate section of the
statute provides a defense for employers against age discrimina-
tion when "age is a bona fide occupational qualification."57 Cline
argued that the meaning of "age" in this section could not be lim-
ited to old age, as it "would then provide a defense (old age is a
bona fide qualification) only for an employer's action that...
would never clash with the statute (because preferring the older
is not forbidden)."" Therefore, if the meaning of "age" is applied
uniformly throughout the statute, it must always refer to both old
and young age.59 The Court countered this argument by noting
that identical words in the same statute do not always have the
same meaning when the word in question has more than one
51. Id.
52, Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1244.
56. Id. at 1245.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
58. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1245.
59. See id.
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common meaning," and by saying that the language in a statute
always has to glean its meaning from the words surrounding it,
as well as from the social and legislative history.61 Here, "'age'
means 'old age' when teamed with 'discrimination.'
6 2
In his dissent, Justice Thomas took a diametrically opposed
view. He noted first that instead of jumping straight to a consid-
eration of the legislative history of the ADEA, the Court should
have looked more closely at the plain meaning of the statute,
which, if unambiguous, would preclude a more in depth review.6"
In examining the plain meaning of the phrase "discriminate...
because of such individual's age,"64 Justice Thomas concluded
that the statute obviously allows reverse discrimination law-
suits.65 He conceded that the word "age" could have the alterna-
tive meaning of "old age," but concluded that this is not the pri-
mary use of the word, and "the use of the word 'age' in other
portions of the statute effectively destroys any doubt" as to the
intended choice of meanings.66
2. Senator Yarborough's Statement
Cline and the EEOC also argued that a statement made by
Senator Yarborough during debates on the ADEA supported an
action for reverse discrimination.67 Yarborough, a sponsor of the
bill, noted that "[t]he law prohibits age being a factor in the deci-
sion to hire, as to one age over the other, whichever way his deci-
sion went."6 The majority dismissed this statement as "the only
item in all the 1967 hearings, reports, and debates going against
60. Id. at 1245-46 ("The presumption of uniform usage thus relents when a word used
has several commonly understood meanings among which a speaker can alternate in the
course of an ordinary conversation, without being confused or getting confusing.").
61. Id. at 1246-47.
62. Id. at 1246.
63. Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
65. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1250-51 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also noted that his inter-
pretation of the statute was not defeated by the limitation of the protected class to those
forty years of age and older. Id. at 1251 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He said that "[a] person
over 40 fired due to irrational age discrimination (whether because the worker is too
young or too old) might have a more difficult time recovering from the discharge and find-
ing new employment." Id.
67. Id. at 1247.
68. 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967).
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the grain of the common understanding of age discrimination."69
In his dissent, Justice Thomas objected to the Court's seemingly
arbitrary dismissal of Yarborough's statement, saying that "Sena-
tor Yarborough, in the only exchange that the parties identified
from the legislative history discussing this particular question,
confirmed that the text really meant what it said."7"
3. Deference to the EEOC
The third and final argument of Cline and the EEOC was that
the EEOC's interpretive regulation, 29 C.F.R. section 1625.2(a),
which supported the view that reverse age discrimination is ille-
gal, should, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.,71 be given great deference by the Court.72 The
majority also dismissed this argument, saying that it was not
necessary to decide how much deference to give an agency regula-
tion when the agency is clearly wrong, as the EEOC was in this
case. 
73
In a short dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia said that as "the
EEOC's interpretation [was] neither foreclosed by [the text ofi the
statute nor unreasonable," the Court should defer to the regula-
tion and allow suits for reverse age discrimination.74 Justice
Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's argument in a separate dissent. 5
4. Social History Criticism
Justice Thomas's dissent also criticized the majority's "social
history" conclusion, noted above, "that if Congress has in mind a
particular, principal, or primary form of discrimination when it
passes an antidiscrimination provision ... then the phrase...
only covers the principal or most common form of discrimina-
69. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1247.
70. Id. at 1252 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
72. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1248.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 1251-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that "[elven if
the Court disagrees with my interpretation of the language of the statute, it strains credu-
lity to argue that such a reading is so unreasonable that an agency could not adopt it." Id.
at 1251.
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tion."76 Justice Thomas contrasted this conclusion with the
Court's willingness to interpret the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to al-
low suits for reverse race discrimination, even though Congress
undoubtedly only had discrimination against minorities, primar-
ily blacks, in mind when it passed the statute.77 Justice Thomas
concluded that "[in light of the Court's opinion today, it appears
that this Court has been treading down the wrong path with re-
spect to Title VII since at least 1976."17' The majority summarily
dismissed Justice Thomas's Title VII argument, noting that the
word "age" is not analogous to the terms "race" and "sex" in Title
VII, as they are "general terms that in every day usage require
modifiers to indicate any relatively narrow application."79
D. Criticisms of the Court's Opinion
1. Was the Majority Correct to Consider Legislative History?
One of Justice Thomas's primary arguments in favor of reverse
age discrimination was that courts must go no further than the
plain language of the ADEA to determine that such suits are
permissible.8 0 In a similar case, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,"1 the
Supreme Court had to determine whether the term "employees"
includes "former employees" with reference to section 704(a) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 The Court noted that
its "first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether
the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case."83 Therefore, only if
76. Id. at 1253 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1253-54 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1254 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1247. The Court further noted that "the prohibition of age discrimination is
readily read more narrowly than analogous provisions dealing with race and sex. That
narrower reading is the more natural one in the textual setting, and it makes perfect
sense because of Congress's demonstrated concern with distinctions that hurt older peo-
ple." Id.
80. Id. at 1250 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For discussions of whether the plain meaning
of the ADEA precludes an examination of legislative history, see generally Buchakjian,
supra note 19, at 1641-43; Cullen, supra note 19, at 291-300; Kelly J. Hartzler, Note, Re-
verse Age Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Protecting All
Members of the Protected Class, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 217, 246-51 (2003).
81. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
82. Id. at 339. See generally Amy L. Schuchman, The Special Problem of the "Younger
Older Worker": Reverse Age Discrimination and the ADEA, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 360-61
(2004) (explaining the standard used in Robinson to interpret statutes).
83. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340.
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the statutory language is ambiguous should a court go beyond
that language to consider other sources of meaning, such as legis-
lative history. The Court also said that "[t]he plainness or ambi-
guity of statutory language is determined by reference to the lan-
guage itself, the specific context in which that language is used,
and the broader context of the statute as a whole." 4
Accordingly, the majority in General Dynamics, following its
own interpretation standards, was only justified in proceeding di-
rectly to an examination of legislative history if the language of
section 623(a)(1) is ambiguous. The Court was so justified, as the
ambiguity of the language in question can be shown especially
well by both reference to the language itself and the context of
the statute as a whole.
The language, as noted above, reads that "[i]t shall be unlawful
for an employer... to... discriminate against any individual...
because of such individual's age." 5 Primarily, the term "age" is
ambiguous. There are multiple dictionary definitions of "age,"
some of which say that the word means "the length of time during
which a being or thing has existed" 6 and others of which define it
as "advanced years; old age."" The multitude of definitions of this
word supports the proposition that the language is ambiguous. 8
Equally significant to the determination of ambiguity is the
context of the statute as a whole. For instance, while section
623(a)(1) purports to prohibit age discrimination against "any in-
dividual," 9 section 621(a), which sets forth Congress's statement
of findings, refers almost exclusively to the problems faced by
"older persons" and "older workers." ° While this would seem to
indicate that the statute is only intended to prohibit discrimina-
tion against the old, even the terms "older persons" and "older
workers" can be interpreted in multiple ways. The phrases could
refer to older people in general, which would indeed indicate that
84. Id. at 341.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
86. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 37 (2nd ed. 1993).
87. Id.; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1250 (2004)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the different definitions of the word "age"); Elena Minkin,
Note, Flourishing Forties Against Flaming Fifties: Is Reverse Age Discrimination Action-
able Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act?, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225, 247-48
(2003) (discussing the different dictionary definitions of age).
88. Minkin, supra note 87, at 248.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
90. Id. § 621(a) (2000).
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reverse discrimination is not protected.91 On the other hand, the
phrases could refer to the class of people protected by the ADEA,
those aged forty and older, in which case any discrimination
within that class might be prohibited, whether in favor of the
older or younger members of the class.92
These examples show why the statute, which might seem un-
ambiguous at first glance, actually has a number of words and
provisions, both in the section in question and with regard to the
statute as a whole, that evade simple definition and classifica-
tion.93 Therefore, the Court was correct to resort to the legislative
history of the ADEA, which, as evidenced in the Court's thorough
discussion, clearly indicated Congress's intention to protect old,
not young, employees from age discrimination.94 Both the legisla-
tive and judicial history helped the Court resolve the ADEA's
ambiguity and come to its ultimate holding.
2. Should the Court Have Deferred to the EEOC's Interpretation
of the ADEA?
The dissent also criticized the majority for not deferring to the
EEOC's reasonable interpretation of the ADEA.95 It is true that
in Chevron, the Court noted that if a statute is ambiguous with
respect to the issue in question, the Court should defer to the
agency's interpretation of that statute if it is permissible.96 In a
footnote, however, the Court further clarified its position by say-
ing that "[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory con-
struction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the pre-
cise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect."97 Here, the Court employed the tools of statutory con-
struction by looking to the legislative history of an ambiguous
91. Minkin, supra note 87, at 252.
92. See id.; see also Aaron J. Rogers, Note, Discrimination Against Younger Members
of the ADEA's Protected Class, 89 IowA L. REV. 313, 335 (2003) (explaining that the phrase
'older workers" could be interpreted to refer to the ADEA's protected class).
93. See generally Rogers, supra note 92, at 336, which explains that the ADEA's ex-
emptions for minimum age requirements on pension plans can only serve to protect em-
ployers from claims by younger employees that they are being discriminated against in
favor of older employees. These provisions would also contribute to ambiguity, as they
could be inconsistent with the statute's statement of findings.
94. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1240-43 (2004).
95. See id. at 1251-52 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
97. Id. at 843 n.9.
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statute and found that Congress had an intention to protect older
workers, not younger workers, against discrimination. 98 Chevron
deference to the EEOC regulation was not necessary, since, as
the Court concluded, the EEOC's regulation was "clearly
wrong."99
Additionally, though not noted by the Court, it is significant
that the EEOC regulation in question, section 1625.2(a), °° con-
flicts with other EEOC regulations. Section 1625.2(b) of the
EEOC guidelines says that "[tihe extension of additional bene-
fits... to older employees within the protected group may be law-
ful if an employer has a reasonable basis to conclude that those
benefits will counteract problems related to age discrimina-
tion." °1 While section 1625.2(a) purports to eliminate reverse age
discrimination," 2 the following subsection recognizes, as does the
ADEA, that older employees face special problems of age dis-
crimination and must be protected. 03 It would have been impos-
sible for the Court to defer to both of these EEOC regulations at
the same time.
3. Does the Court's Holding Conflict With Title VII Actions?
The majority rejected Justice Thomas's argument that reverse
age discrimination claims should be allowed, just as reverse race
and gender discrimination claims are allowed under Title VII,
simply by noting that the word "age" is always read more nar-
rowly than the words "race" and "sex." 0 4 There are, however, fur-
ther arguments that support the majority's conclusion. For in-
stance, age cannot be considered an immutable characteristic as
are race and gender and, as a consequence, age does not require
the same level of protection.0 5 Additionally, the fundamental dif-
ference between employment discrimination based on age and
employment discrimination based on race or gender is illustrated
by the fact that Congress failed to include a prohibition on age
98. See Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1240-43.
99. Id. at 1248.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2004).
101. Id. § 1625.2(b).
102. See id. § 1625.2(a).
103. See Minkin, supra note 87, at 260-61.
104. Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1247.
105. See Minkin, supra note 87, at 269 (arguing that age is not immutable as everyone
will eventually become a member of the class).
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discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it
unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individ-
ual... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."0 6
The Supreme Court has never treated age as carefully as race
and gender classifications, which enjoy strict and intermediate
scrutiny, respectively." 7 For example, in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia,0 8 the Court held that age is not a suspect
class, as the people within the class have not traditionally been
discriminated against."0 9 Given the fundamental differences be-
tween age, race, and gender, it is unsurprising and permissible
that the Court chose not to implement an action for reverse age
discrimination as it had done with reverse race and gender dis-
crimination.' 0
IV. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND
SYSTEMS, INC. V. CLINE
The law after the Court's decision in General Dynamics is re-
markably similar to the status of the law before its decision. As
previously noted, before the Court's explicit decision on reverse
age discrimination, it had already shown its unwillingness to ex-
tend protection to younger workers."' The lower federal courts
recognized the Court's preference by almost uniformly ruling
against allowing actions of reverse age discrimination."12 Now
that the Court has officially ruled against these actions, the lower
federal courts have binding authority for their decisions. For in-
stance, soon after the Court handed down its decision in General
Dynamics, the United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
107. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (holding that gender
classifications must satisfy a standard of intermediate scrutiny); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (holding that race classifications must satisfy a standard of strict
scrutiny).
108. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
109. Id. at 313.
110. For a discussion of why age is not afforded the same protection as race and gen-
der, see generally Minkin, supra note 87, at 266-72.
111. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1996); Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
112. See, e.g., Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v.
Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992); Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d
276, 278 (1st Cir. 1988); Karlen v. City Colls. of Chicago, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988).
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trict of North Carolina refused to consider a plaintiffs contention
that because he was too young to participate in an early retire-
ment program, he was being discriminated against in violation of
the ADEA."' The court said that the plaintiffs claim was pre-
cluded because the Supreme Court had made it clear that em-
ployers were not prohibited from favoring older employees over
younger employees." 4
In practical terms, the Court's decision in General Dynamics
protects companies that want to treat older employees more fa-
vorably in anything from retirement benefits to layoff plans."5
Additionally, one commentator noted that "[tihe employer, more-
over, is free to draw the line, for purposes of disparate treatment
in favor of the old, wherever it wishes to-at 50, 60, or 70, for ex-
ample." 6
Reverse discrimination claims are not, however, categorically
impossible after the Court's holding in General Dynamics. States,
like Oregon, can write provisions into their age discrimination
laws that lower the floor on the protected class to eighteen years
of age, which allows employees the maximum amount of protec-
tion." '7 Additionally, states are beginning to allow reverse age
discrimination claims in their own courts. For instance, in Zanni
v. Medaphis Physician Services Corp.,"' the plaintiff was fired
and replaced by an older employee who was less qualified for the
job." '9 The terminated employee filed an action for age discrimi-
nation under Michigan state law, 2 ' which said that employers
could not discriminate against employees because of their age.' 2 '
The law defined "age" as "chronological age."'22 With this defini-
tion, the Michigan court easily concluded that the law allowed re-
verse discrimination actions. 23 The court contrasted the defini-
113. Hall v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., No. 1:02CV00839, 2004 WL 1763218, at *31 (M.D.N.C. July
27, 2004).
114. Id.
115. Stephen Henderson, Older Workers May Have Extra Benefits, Court Says, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 25, 2004, at A2.
116. Beth A. Bourassa, The Enemy of 40 is 30, Not 50, N.Y. EMP. L. & PRAC., Apr. 2004,
at 3, 4.
117. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2003); Minkin, supra note 87, at 265-66 (noting
that Oregon is one of the few states to allow the young to sue for age discrimination).
118. 612 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
119. Id. at 846.
120. Id.
121. MICH. COMP. LAws § 37.2202(1)(a) (2001).
122. Id. § 37.2103(a).
123. See Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 847.
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tion of "age" in the Michigan statute against the ADEA, conclud-
ing that the Michigan law is not as restrictive as the ADEA. 24
Other state courts have made similar conclusions; 125 thus, the
state courts are another road open to potential reverse age dis-
crimination plaintiffs.
126
V. CONCLUSION
While the state of the law has not significantly changed since
the Court's decision in General Dynamics, it is now clear that the
ADEA does not provide for reverse age discrimination claims. It
seems as though employers are free to favor their older workers
over their younger employees in collective bargaining agree-
ments, retirement plans, and perhaps even in hiring or promotion
decisions. The path to a successful claim now lies in the state
courts, unless Congress reacts to the Court's decision by amend-
ing the ADEA or passing a new age discrimination statute.
Rebecca L. Ennis
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 949-50 (N.J. 1999)
(holding that New Jersey law allows reverse discrimination claims and noting the textual
differences between the state law and the ADEA).
126. See generally Minkin, supra note 87, at 262-66 for a discussion of state reverse
age discrimination laws and claims.
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